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Abstract 
This paper considers whether employee ownership mitigates the negative workplace outcomes 
identified by the Disconnected Capitalism Thesis (DCT).  Drawing on a programme of in-depth 
interviews with workers and managers in EOBs, the paper reveals how they are partially 
insulated from the vicissitudes endemic within contemporary capitalism.  In contrast to the 
workplace outcomes envisaged within the DCT, these firms are characterised by strong 
workforce participation, high levels of employment security, active employee engagement and 
strong levels of employee creativity.  Not only are these features beneficial for productivity and 
firm performance, they generate a form of “connected” capitalism, partially offsetting wider 
negative systemic forces at play in the economy.  
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1. Introduction  
“The problem with capitalism is there aren’t enough capitalists” (Quote from the Employee 
Ownership film “We the Owners”) 
The global financial crisis starting in 2007 instigated a ‘fundamental rethink’ (Stiglitz, 2015) 
about the socio-economic relationships in many advanced economies, leading to increased 
interest in alternatives to investor-owned firms (Blasi et al. 2014).  Of particular interest to 
researchers and policy makers in this regard is employee ownership (Poutsma et al. 2012; 
Pendleton and Poutsma 2012; Blasi et al. 2016).  According to some, this ‘atypical’ mode of 
corporate governance is a means of mitigating the inherent inequalities and instabilities 
endemic within contemporary capitalism (Kruse et al. 2010; Blasi et al. 2014; Kurtulus and 
Kruse, 2017)1.   
However, some scholars question the likelihood and sustainability of this kind of ‘equitable’ 
outcome within the workplace (Thompson 2003)2, especially given the deleterious effects 
globalisation and financialisation are having across workplaces, most notably chronic job 
insecurity and employee detachment (McCann 2014; Thompson 2013).  The so-called 
disconnected capitalism thesis (henceforth DCT) conceptualises the systemic forces within 
                                                          
1 Some scholars use terms such as ‘shared capitalism’ (Kruse et al. 2010), ‘broad-based capitalism’ (Blasi et al. 
2016) or ‘responsible enterprise’ (Storey and Salaman 2017) to denote these alternative ownership arrangements.   
2While Thompson does not explicitly pay reference to employee ownership, this is arguably one of the high-
commitment work regimes he claims cannot withstand the malign forces embedded within the DCT.  
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global capitalism which are argued to be fundamentally recasting labour-management relations 
(Thompson 2003; Dobbins and Dundon 2015).  Linking these macro-level changes to upheavals 
at the micro-level of the firm, Thompson (2003) claims there is a “massive tension” between 
the types of stability needed to foster high performance in the workplace and the “insecurity 
inherent in current forms of corporate governance” (p. 365) and that employees are “asked to 
unconditionally invest more of themselves” while “employer promises are purely conditional” 
(pp. 364-365).   
While the DCT is “theoretically attentive to how workplace processes are linked to macro-
structures” (Hauptmeier and Vidal 2014: 22), little attempt has been made to assess its 
potential implications for workers or workplace relations.  This paper examines whether 
employee owned businesses (EOBs) are able to withstand the destabilising forces conveyed 
within the DCT.  Strictly speaking, as projected within the DCT, EOBs and their employees would 
seem just as likely to befall the same negative consequences afflicting traditional capitalist 
organisations.  However, this goes against the vast body of literature on employee ownership 
accumulated over the last three decades indicating that these firms perform differently to more 
conventionally-structured firms on a number of metrics such as firm survival, job security, levels 
of employee participation, human capital development and wage levels (Baghdadi et al. 2013; 
Kramer 2010; Pendleton and Robinson, 2011; O’Boyle et al. 2016; Richter and Schrader 2016); 
even during recessionary periods (Lampel et al. 2014; Kurtulus and Kruse 2017).   
Importantly, however, a key omission within this literature is an in-depth examination of the 
workplace factors underpinning this organisational resilience despite the dysfunctional aspects 
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of contemporary capitalism.  This paper seeks to fill this gap.  Therefore, the paper makes a 
novel theoretically-informed contribution to the employee ownership literature by examining 
the nature of workplace conditions and management-labour relations within employee-owned 
firms during an era of intense economic and labour market turbulence following the financial 
crisis. The paper’s overriding research question is: can employee ownership insulate firms from 
the dysfunctional elements of contemporary capitalism depicted by the disconnected capitalism 
thesis?   
The paper reports the findings of an in-depth empirical study of firms transitioning into 
employee ownership in Scottish firms during the post financial crisis period 3.  Scotland provides 
an interesting empirical backdrop to this research as successive Scottish and UK governments 
have extolled “the virtues of the John Lewis economy” (Wilkinson et al. 2014: 739)4, with 
employee ownership attracting more attention than ever before (Pendleton 2011).  Somewhat 
paradoxically, renewed interest in the ‘participative infrastructure’ of firms (Wright and Snell 
1998) has been particularly strong in liberal market economies such as the UK and the USA 
(Croucher et al. 2010).  Indeed, an estimated one-fifth of all private sector employment is under 
employee ownership in the USA (Kurtulus and Kruse 2017) while in the UK EOBs contribute 
£30bn to the country’s GDP and are growing at a rate of nearly 10% per annum5.   Examining 
employee ownership in this context is therefore highly salient owing to its important societal 
and policy relevance.   
                                                          
3 This paper focuses solely on EOBs where employees, either directly or through an employee benefits trust, hold 
the majority of shares.    
4 John Lewis is a UK major employee-owned retailer employing 90,000 “partners” (Storey and Salaman 2017).  
5 Data from the Employee Ownership Association website: http://employeeownership.co.uk/ 
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The remainder of the paper considers relevant literature, followed by an outline of the methods 
used and the characteristics of the interviewed firms. Next the findings are presented, before a 
discussion and conclusions are drawn.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 The Disconnected Capitalism Thesis  
Thompson (2013) acknowledges that the DCT is not a comprehensive theory but rather a wide-
ranging conceptual umbrella encapsulating the changing nature of institutional inter-relations 
and dynamics, inherent within contemporary capitalism, which are marked by “increased and 
disruptive tensions between what capital is seeking from employees in the labour process and 
what it finds necessary to enforce in the realm of employment relations” (Thompson, 2003: 
364).   Three core interlinked factors are claimed to underpin the transition to disconnected 
capitalism: the “disappearance of the old economy” characterised by large-scale Fordist firms 
supplanted by “knowledge-based labour in a largely service context”; a shift to “internalized 
commitment and self-discipline among employees”; and the substitution of hierarchy by 
networks “in which private capital is the only significant actor, with the state and labour 
marginalized” (Thompson, 2003: 359) 6.  Cumulatively these forces coalesce to produce a 
powerful ‘cocktail’ where the “structural tendencies, driven by developments in capital 
markets….are exacerbating disunity between these different domains” (Thompson 2003: 360).  
For example, Thompson (2013) notes how target setting for cost savings and performance 
                                                          
6 The terms “Fordism” and “Fordist” are used interchangeably in this paper to denote the diverse macroeconomic 
regime linking mass production and mass consumption, labour processes linked to Taylorism and associated 
welfare policies commonly associated with regulation theorists (Jessop 1995). 
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measures tighten control and reduce security for large sections of the workforce.  Furthermore, 
global finance has “ceased simply to assist the running and operation of the real economy…but 
rather has come to dominate, even displace, the latter” (Christopherson 2013: 352).  
The DCT suggests that many of the macro-level structural changes associated with this 
emerging global neoliberal economic paradigm are likely to lead to erosions of workplace 
conditions, reducing employment security and conditions within the workplace (Thompson 
2013).  So what are key micro-foundations of the DCT?  Crucially, within this environment one 
could expect recurring features running across profit-driven organisations to include increasing 
levels of employment insecurity, increased casualization of employment, downward pressure 
on pay and conditions, diminished employee autonomy/creativity and increased use of 
outsourcing to lower cost non-unionised environments.  For example, recent survey data 
reveals that approximately 20% of workers in the UK are not in regular full-time employment 
and that performance monitoring for non-managerial staff rose from 43% in 2004 to 70% in 
2011 (Findlay and Thompson, 2017).  Furthermore, the 2016 Labour Force Survey shows that 
905,000 people (or 2.8% of the UK workforce) in the UK were on zero-hour contracts, a rise of 
more than 100,000 since 2015 (ONS, 2017).  Consequently, there are “sharp declines in 
employee commitment and morale related to factors such as job insecurity” (Thompson 2003: 
373).  In other words, systemic macro factors outlined above directly translate into a more 
precarious, volatile and disengaged workplace environment, resulting in heightened job 
insecurity, short-term employment contracts, increasing levels of zero-hour contracts and 
increased performance monitoring (Rubery et al. 2016).   
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It would seem plausible that the level or effectiveness of “employee voice”, itself an important 
aspect of “job quality” (Gaillie 2013), might also become increasingly side-lined in this 
environment (Hauptmeier and Vidal 2014). Decreasing levels of employee voice would also 
have a knock-on effect in terms of employee motivation, trust, engagement and creative input 
in the workplace.  Given the non-permanent, contingent nature of labour, discussed above, 
coupled with the attendant “workplace fissuring” (Weil 2014) presumably longer-term 
investments, such as developing human capital, would also be reduced.  Indeed, financialisation 
might continue to reward value extraction rather than value creation, an important by-product 
being that access to capital to enable investment becomes problematic for all but the largest 
corporations (Appelbaum and Batt 2014).        
A potential limitation of the DCT is an implied universalism, with the inference that all forms of 
capitalist enterprises are set on a collision course with these wider systemic forces.  According 
to some, the tensions between minimal workplace regulation and managerial prerogative 
suggest a “high probability that managers may renege on bargains generated with employees 
even under work regimes designed for collaborative mutuality” (Dobbins and Dundon 2015: 3).   
Little room is left within the concept for ‘agency’, in the form of organisations that deviate from 
the –i.e. independent shareholder company- capitalist norm, which can try to withstand these 
volatile pressures.  Protagonists of the DCT concede, however, that not all workers will be 
equally affected by the malign forces associated with growing insecurity and attendant 
workplace pressures (Findlay and Thompson, 2017).  It begs the question whether there are 
some organisational forms, such as employee ownership, which can at least in part insulate 
their workers from the potential adverse effects encapsulated by the DCT?   Indeed, some 
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researchers claim that within this new turbulent landscape, employee ownership can offer an 
effective means of “saving jobs and anchoring capital in communities” by “changing workplace 
relations and introducing workplace relations on the basis of trust” (Wills and Lincoln 1999: 
1509).  
2.2 Employee-Ownership and Management-Labour Relations 
We now examine the unique nature of employee ownership which may result in different 
workplace outcomes to those envisaged by the DCT.  Several authors postulate that within 
some atypical work environments, such as employee ownership, managers may be less willing 
to renege on workplace bargains agreed with employees (Kruse et al. 2010; Blasi et al. 2014).  
Owing to their unique ownership and organisational structures many of fundamental problems 
within conventional firms, such as classic principal-agent issues, are reconciled.   
Blair (1998), for example, illustrates how employee ownership manages to ‘square this circle’ by 
ensuring that the risk-bearers are those directly in control of the firm.  Having employees who 
are also owners of the firm, aligns the interests of shareholders and employees in such a way 
that “their relationship with the organization is changed and this affects the way they think and 
behave” (Wagner et al. 2003: 848).  Furthermore, employee opportunism is checked through 
screening, social conditioning and incentive instruments (Williamson, 1985).  Governance 
systems also determine how decisions about resource allocation are made and how 
management and employees are evaluated, remunerated and promoted (Blair 1995).  
According to some researchers, a firm’s employees are much more likely to be motivated to 
“find new ways to innovate or cut costs” if they “share in the wealth creation by these 
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activities” (Blair 1995: 17).  This suggests the governance structures of organisations are 
inextricably linked to the nature of how employees are personally incentivised and their 
operational outcomes and hence to the effects of DCT.   
Empirical evidence suggests that EOBs can, and do, respond and behave differently to 
conventional investor-owned firms in a number of ways.  Scholars claim interest in employee 
ownership stems from the fact it can stimulate workers to work harder and more effectively; 
produce greater employment stability and firm survival; broaden the distribution of income; 
and create more harmonious workplaces by aligning incentives (Kurtulus and Kruse, 2017).  
Explanations for higher productivity appear to hinge on the bringing together and integrating of 
a number of human resources policies and practices, management, leadership and 
organisational development (Kruse et al. 2010; Pendleton and Robinson 2010; O’Boyle et al. 
2017).  In particular, their focus on so-called “high commitment” models such as high 
performance work systems (Appelbaum 2000) is in stark contrast to traditional “ones based on 
control and compliance” (Thompson 2011: 358).  Under this model employees are generally 
much more engaged in the firm’s activities by thinking and acting like “owners” (Wagner et al. 
2003).   
One critical distinction differentiating EOBs from traditional firms is the greater levels of job 
security it instils within employees.  Security of employment seems to be the primary “tie that 
binds” workers to worker-owned organisations (Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014).  Research strongly 
shows that these businesses are also associated with sustainable long-term growth, especially 
in terms of continuity of employment (Kurtulus and Kruse, 2017).  In the UK, EOBs out-perform 
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non-EOBs especially in terms of employment stability during the latest recession, and 
researchers suggest that EOBs view their employees as their “biggest asset” (Lampel et al. 
2014).  Recent research in the USA similarly found that EOBs were less likely to reduce 
employment in the face of economic shocks (Kurtulus and Kruse 2017).  In other words, these 
firms can weather the economic cycle more effectively than traditional firms thereby providing 
additional macroeconomic stability during recessionary periods. High levels of employment 
stability and reduced labour-management conflict also contribute to the improved employee 
“wellbeing” within these firms.  Job insecurity, in particular, can have direct links to wellbeing at 
work and research suggests EOBs perform strongly on this measure (McQuaid et al. 2012)7.   
An additional knock-on effect of employee ownership is the ability of employers to retain staff - 
for instance through greater psychological commitment by employees (McConville et al. 2016; 
Rousseau and Shperling 2003; Pendleton et al. 1998).  A recent comparative study found EOBs 
to have lower workforce turnover, with positive benefits in terms of productivity (Basterretxea 
and Storey, 2017).  Higher wages also linked to employee ownership, which is thought to 
contribute to “the construction of a trust culture inside firms” (Baghdadi et al. 2013: 15).   
Overall, most studies have highlighted both extrinsic motivational factors, such as higher wages, 
which derive from employee ownership (Klein 1987), and intrinsic motivation, such as 
recognition, security and fair treatment within the context of employee-owned firms, as factors 
driving organisational commitment and performance (Kuvaas 2003).  While some of the 
                                                          
7 Employee ownership seems to produce higher rankings on a range of wellbeing measures such as job satisfaction, 
job security and sense of achievement (see McQuaid et al. 2012).   
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evidence is mixed, the majority of studies suggest that under employee ownership firms seem 
to operate and function differently to conventional capitalist firms.     
Naturally, the literature has limitations: it is under-theorised (Caramelli 2011) and dominated 
by quantitative studies.  Arguably, more qualitative methods are needed to help unravel the 
intricacies of how these firms operate, especially in difficult recessionary periods (Kurtulus and 
Kruse 2017).  While attempting to help overcome some of these omissions the main aim of this 
paper is somewhat bolder.  This study undertakes a novel theoretically informed qualitative 
analysis of management-labour relations within (mostly small) firms either in, or transitioning 
to, employee-ownership. Given the hypothesised effects of disconnected capitalism highlighted 
above - namely increased insecurity of employment, declining employee participation, 
increased levels of performance measurement and reduced levels of employee well-being - it is 
important to examine whether these behavioural and organisational factors are equally 
prevalent across EOBs.  Therefore, the major innovation of this paper is its attempt to widen 
the focus of previous studies to assess whether employee ownership provides a full or partial 
resolution to apparent key contradictions inherent within contemporary capitalism.  In other 
words, can employee ownership insulate firms from the dysfunctional elements of 
contemporary capitalism depicted by the DCT?   
3. Methods  
3.1 Definitions and Method 
Employee ownership encompasses a broad array of practices.  Unfortunately, different variants 
of employee ownership are often used interchangeably despite considerable heterogeneity 
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across organisational forms (Kruse et al. 2010; O’Boyle et al. 2016).  Given these definitional 
ambiguities, care was taken to ensure the same types of firms were examined during the study.  
Pendleton (2011: 315) distinguishes firms with financial participation using a threefold 
taxonomy: worker cooperatives; firms with minority share plans; and “firms that are 
substantially or wholly worked owned”.  The firms examined in this sample all fell into the latter 
category, including having a heightened level of employee voice. All the firms examined 
adopted these forms of ownership and organisational structures.   
The study was based on ten in-depth case studies of Scottish EOBs8, an effective method for 
exploring complex multi-causal empirical phenomena (Eisenhardt 1989).  Interviews were the 
primary method used to construct the case studies as they are suitable for exploring the 
complex issues shaping management-employee relations and employee ‘voice’.  Semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions were conducted, enabling unprompted issues 
arising from interviewees to be delved into more deeply.  The types of questions covered 
during the interviews probed into the nature of the transition to employee ownership; 
employee participation levels; job security; employee autonomy, engagement and creative 
input; organisational performance issues and financial impediments to effective performance.  
Particular focus was paid to the cognitive behaviours and mind-set of employees and managers 
in relation to issues pertaining to the DCT such as workplace relations, feelings of job security 
and workforce engagement.   To prevent “organisational silence” anonymity was guaranteed to 
                                                          
8 While a relatively small sample size, this does nonetheless represent around a sixth of all EOBs in Scotland at the 
time of the study (see CDS 2012).   
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interviewees, but unlike other recent studies on worker owned businesses the interviews took 
place within the workplace context (Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014).       
From the total population of 86 employee-owned firms based in Scotland, fifteen EOBs were 
contacted using a database provided by Cooperative Development Scotland (CDS).  Five 
declined to participate in the research leaving a sample of 10 firms.  All the firms had their 
headquarters in Scotland.  Past research examining employee ownership has often tended to 
overlook “employees” (Poutsma et al. 2012: 1514).  To address this anomaly, the research 
elicited the views from both managers and employees within the same firms to help triangulate 
the different management-labour perspectives. Two people from each of the ten firms - one 
manager and one employee - were interviewed (n=20).  All the employees interviewed were, or 
had been, employee representatives.  The interviews were mainly conducted face-to-face 
(n=15) with the remainder (based in remote areas or where participants requested) by 
telephone.  On average, the interviews lasted between 30-60 minutes and were audio recorded 
with the interviewees’ permission.  All interviews were transcribed verbatim.    
In order to triangulate the veracity of the data from the firm-specific interviews, a range of 
other stakeholders were also interviewed such as business support managers from CDS, policy 
makers and other organisations (Employee Ownership Association, specialist funders and 
lawyers, banks) to examine more general issues in relation to the situation within firms 
adopting employee ownership, resulting in a further 14 interviews.  In total the research 
involved 34 interviews, a figure above the norm for workplace studies (Saunders and Townsend 
2016).   
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3.2 Data Analysis 
The resulting transcriptions of interviews were analysed using a partially grounded analysis 
(Charmez 2014). They were analysed in the manner outlined by Easterby-Smith et al. (2015) for 
whom grounded analysis tends to be holistic as it aims to derive structure from data by 
comparing different data fragments with one another. Several members of the research team 
undertook the preliminary data coding process (data familiarisation, reflection and open-
coding).  Discussions between co-authors were an important part of the coding process. At this 
stage codes were keep simple to enable the researchers to remain close to the data (Charmaz 
2014).  Following this, the researchers undertook the second order conceptualisation which 
included focused re-coding, linking and re-evaluation.  This method allowed for the 
identification of several key themes informed by the research objectives (such as workplace 
engagement, employment security, employee engagement and creativity), which were entered 
into a matrix to allow comparability of issues across interviews.  Once the initial coding took 
place formal case studies were constructed for each case.   
3.3 Firm Characteristics 
Cumulatively, the ten firms employed approximately 2,750 people in 2012, representing just 
over half of the overall employment within Scottish EOBs.  The majority were SMEs employing 
considerably less than 249 employees, except one who had a turnover of over £150 ($200) 
million and around 700 employees (see Table 1). A key feature of the cohort was their 
considerable heterogeneity.  The diverse sectoral and spatial composition of EOBs was reflected 
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in the sample with a range of activities such as residential care homes, publishing and high-tech 
manufacturing and a wide geographic coverage of the firms across the whole of Scotland.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The firms were also quite disparate in terms of age with the majority established during the last 
twenty to thirty years, but three firms were significantly older.  An interesting feature of the 
majority of these firms’ was their previous ownership status – the majority were previously 
family-owned firms and only one of the participating businesses had been employee owned 
since its inception.  Employee ownership was relatively new to most of the firms with five being 
employee owned for less than three years, three being employee owned for 8 years, 18 years 
and 35 years respectively and with two still in the process of transition towards employee 
ownership9.   
In terms of their performance, less variation was discernible.  The participating EOBs supplied 
around 5 years annual data on turnover, number of employees; pre-tax profit, percentage 
profit margin and return on capital employed.  The main indicators of performance examined 
were employment and turnover growth.  With the exception of firm D, all the firms in the 
sample had been experiencing relatively strong employment and turnover growth over recent 
years.  Financial data from the FAME business database was used to compare the performance 
of the participating firms against a selection of non-EOB counterparts10.  The peer group was 
selected from companies in the same sector and similar size brackets.  Paired t-tests were used 
                                                          
9 While in the transitional process these firms have adopted the workplace practices associated with employee 
ownership status.     
10 The findings from this element of the study are reported elsewhere (reference to be inserted after refereeing).      
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to ascertain if the differences between EOBs were significantly higher than their peers (5% 
significance levels).  This found that the performance of these Scottish EOBs was generally 
superior to their peers in terms of growth (consistent with many other studies cited above).  
Overall, Scottish EOBs appear to have, on the whole, higher turnover, employee growth, higher 
profitability and greater return on capital than their non-EOB counterparts.  The only area 
where they performed less well was on average salaries which may owe to the frequent use of 
profit-related bonus schemes within these firms and to the value given to retaining profits for 
investment.     
4. Empirical Findings  
The findings below report the responses of both management and employees within these 
EOBs in relation to the potential negative aspects associated the DCT.  To unpack whether these 
firms can withstand the pressures endemic with DCT we examine workplace participation, job 
security within EOBs, employee autonomy, engagement, creativity and the impact on their 
financial affairs.  
4.1 Workplace Participation 
The DCT predicts that workplace participation and employee engagement will be largely absent 
in firms.  Therefore, we would expect to see minimal levels of workplace participation and 
employee engagement within the cohort of interviewed firms.  Contrary to these expectations 
the EOB workplaces examined seem to display strong levels of workplace participation and high 
levels of employee engagement.  Pathways into employee ownership are often complex and 
the cohort of firms clearly represents a complex picture of their evolution towards employee 
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ownership status.  A number of managers and employees noted the developing nature of 
employee participation and workplace culture and the need to move towards more 
participative management styles.  
 “One of the biggest problems we have had, and still have, but hope to cure, is the ‘us 
and them’ one.  And I can understand that because the previous owner gave out no 
news.  He never gave out bad news; he never gave out good news.  He made his 
decisions….that always builds up a mistrust, so we have a job in changing that” 
(Director) 
From the employee side, in terms of formal participation mechanisms, employee 
representatives were in the vast majority of cases (n, 8) elected for a term (often three years) 
on the Board to contribute employee views.  For these employees, discussing issues directly 
affecting their colleagues, and being open with senior staff members, could be a challenging 
and evolving process.  
“The first time you go up it’s really quite a daunting thing to talk to the head of the 
company; but after 5 or 6 meetings it becomes a lot easier and a lot more open and 
honest, because you can ask a question without a fear of losing your job I suppose” 
(Employee) 
Regular general meetings were also held in some of the companies, which enabled 
employees to ask questions and have open discussions with management about 
performance and financial issues, a process uncommon in traditional UK SMEs.  According to 
one employee: “they don’t hold back about money situations, everything is talked about” 
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(Employee).   These sessions were perceived positively and the communication of financial 
performance issues or ‘open-book’ accounting was the key to the process of employee 
ownership for many11.  The managers also cited the value of the contributions made by 
employee representatives at these meetings.   
“The biggest change for me as a decision-maker is the significant contributions I get from 
the other groups and it’s just so much better to have six opinions than two” (Director) 
This suggests the move to employee participation entailed firms becoming more inclusive 
and open, with employees having a greater influence over decisions; although this influence 
can still be limited in certain respects.  For instance, one employee highlighted that 
increased employee awareness of the position of the business was not always positive and 
could increase anxiety among the workforce, where previously they may not have fully 
grasped the negative effects of the recession.  However, increased feelings of ‘togetherness’, 
because of employee ownership, could help counter these feelings.  Employees also felt a 
greater responsibility to become involved in decision-making, which helped reduce any 
conflict between employees and management compared to (previous) non-EOB situations. 
“Well it is actually, because especially at the moment when the economy is quite bad and 
you do see the sales going down. So yes it is quite stressful because it is hard to know how 
to pull that back (a)round…But it is nice to know that there are [all] of us in it together, it’s 
not just on a few shoulders, it’s on us all. So that is good” (Employee) 
                                                          
11 Open book accounting in employee-owned firms is the process of making financial information both available 
and accessible to employees within a firm – such informational transparency often features in firms with very high 
levels of employee participation (Timming and Brown 2015). 
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“By not listening to the employees, that’s when things start to have a bit of a conflict and 
it prevents people from all having one focused goal and all working towards one goal” 
(Employee) 
While employee ownership was accompanied by a move to ownership-centred voice, 
power-centred forms of voice did remain in some cases, such as the emphasis on the 
continued role of directors as the final decision makers. 
“At the end of the day somebody has to be the one who has to carry the can for making a 
decision whether there is a deadlock or gridlock; but I think we are quite responsive and 
inclusive in the way that is operated. So people know the buck stops somewhere. 
Sometimes then they’re quite comfortable with that as long as it has been explained to 
them, as long as there is a rationale there they can understand” (Director)  
4.2 Employment Security  
Endemic problems of job insecurity are strongly depicted within the DCT.  Therefore, we would 
anticipate concerns and uncertainty around continuity of employment to be prevalent among 
firm employees.  Despite this, high levels of employment security seemed to be a recurring 
feature permeating throughout the organisations studied, although this security was subject to 
wider sectoral and cyclical pressures.  As noted above, over half of the sample (seven firms) had 
recently become employee-owned.  Owing to this it was difficult to fully assess how their 
growth performance had altered pre- and post-employee ownership.  Another complicating 
factor was that for many of the firms this transition had occurred during the recent global 
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financial crisis.  Clearly, disentangling the impact of endogenous organisational changes versus 
exogenous factors such as macroeconomic conditions is problematic.   
Interestingly, however, the majority of firms found that the recession “hasn’t been that 
significant” (Director).  Despite these issues, the overall sense from these nascent ‘convertors’ 
to EOBs was that the transition had improved their effectiveness.  As one Director claimed: ‘I 
don’t think it would have grown as quickly as we have if we hadn’t gone down the employee 
ownership route’ (Director)   
Identifying the precise reasons why employee ownership had led to superior economic 
performance uncovered a complex, multi-causal series of contributory factors.  It was observed 
by many employees within EOBs that being a shareholder in the business made them more 
committed and productive workers.  As one employee noted: 
“I think we do try quite a bit harder to make sure that what we do during the course of the 
day is important and I think we’re all working much, much harder. Yeah, because we do 
feel a responsibility” (Employee)  
The attachment of employees to the firm, or organizational commitment, is one explanation for 
this ‘normative commitment’.  What seemed crucial to many workers was that the feeling of 
job security gave workers extra incentives and commitment to their employer.  Feelings of 
greater security of employment seemed to be the primary benefit from this model of 
ownership across the employee interviewees.  This seemed particularly important given the 
potential impact of the recession on the businesses interviewed.    
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“It’s just not about the financial rewards. It’s good but it’s more about the job security.  
From that point of view…all the guys understand that the efforts they put in, not just a 
financial gain but also a long term employment gain and the success of the company; it’s 
securing your future” (Employee)   
“It has been a struggle but we haven’t just turned around and laid people off, we’ve tried 
to get through any problems that we have got, not by losing staff, but by cost saving 
across the business” (Employee) 
An additional consequence of their status as part ‘owners’ was that staff engagement, and 
motivation were seen as high and directors and employees both noticed commensurately 
higher levels of commitment from employees with both financial rewards and perceived job 
security playing a part.  Managers also viewed staff motivation and engagement as important 
drivers of productivity, especially given the tough economic conditions confronting the 
businesses.   
 “We do an annual engagement survey and you know we have certainly seen a significant 
increase in both engagement and the level of satisfaction over the last 3 or 4 years despite 
the economic conditions. So I think that is hugely encouraging for us and again I think it is 
a testament to our employee ownership” (Director) 
4.3 Employee Autonomy, Engagement and Creativity 
At the core of the DCT is a lack of employee engagement which manifests itself in a lack of 
autonomy and creativity.  Typically, low levels of employee autonomy, high levels of 
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performance measurement, limited employee engagement coupled with low levels of 
employee creativity would all feature strongly.  None of these features were evident within the 
firms interviewed.  Many of the firms delegated considerable autonomy to employees and 
none had any strong form of performance measurement frameworks in place.  In turn, this 
appeared to generate more employee autonomy and stronger engagement in the firm.   
A further aspect of employee engagement was the knock-on effect in terms of their 
relationships with other employees.  This relational impact resulted in viewing the ‘entire’ 
organisation more favourably than in traditionally structured companies.  This seemed to result 
in employees working ‘harder’ and ‘smarter’, although as discussed above the motive seemed 
partly based on wider responsibility.  The influence of employee ownership based 
organisational identification on the individual, and the wider impacts of this, was encapsulated 
by both management and labour: 
“I think it comes back to leadership and motivation. If you have got an employee owner 
and you say to them ‘look we need to double our output’, then they know it benefits the 
company and it benefits them because as a shareholder they enjoy the growth in capital.… 
You know, for me, that is at the heart of employee ownership because it really means that 
everyone is in it together and everyone will share in the success of that” (Director) 
“I think because you feel more of a ‘family’ of people because we’re all trying to work 
together. I think we are very committed and I think we are more committed that most 
companies” (Employee) 
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In addition to working harder, employee-ownership in the businesses studied often resulted in 
employees working ‘smarter’ and more creatively, especially in terms of initiating innovative 
activities and problem solving.  This appeared to be the case in the overwhelming majority of 
the businesses, irrespective of size or sector, and was corroborated by both management and 
employees alike.  This sometimes took the form of proactively promoting new innovative 
initiatives within companies.  For example, in one company the employees initiated a workshop 
type event with a key customer to help better customise their products to their specific 
requirements.  It could also take a more indirect form, by employees voicing “shop-floor” 
concerns about the feasibility of various new product-related concepts proposed by 
management.  Nearly all the companies utilised regular ‘open forums’ to explore operational 
issues and how identified difficulties could be resolved.  These are often critical for harnessing a 
supportive culture of adaptation and experimentation.   
In other words there is an inclusive approach towards innovation which resulted in “more ideas 
coming from different parts of the organisation” (Director).  This engagement in turn has a clear 
impact in terms of firm performance by enabling an environment where “people have the guts 
to branch out and take some risks and in doing that have brought in more business” (Employee).    
In a similar vein, employee ownership also improved productivity by encouraging a stronger 
focus on “upward problem solving”.  This is typically linked to enhancements around process 
innovation as well as incremental improvements.  Again, across the companies interviewed the 
vast majority noted how employees often showed their creativity and autonomy by tackling 
problems directly at source rather than referring them upwards to management.  While 
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beneficial for productivity, managers also noted the benefit this yields for management.  One 
Director noted how greater employee autonomy and responsibility, compared to before 
employee ownership resulted in increased productivity: 
“You see higher levels of engagement. We see problems being solved at source rather 
than being passed up through the management line to arrive on the desks of the frazzled 
few. So first responder to solutions, meaning that cost of production fall and productivity 
rises” (Director) 
Being viewed as contributors to the way the business operates clearly resulted in workers 
feeling more committed to their employer.  Also, higher levels of autonomy within EOBs 
appeared to result in greater creativity and levels of delegated authority within the firms.  
Rather than a mechanism for cost minimisation, greater autonomy within the workforce can 
help identify positive spillovers in revenue growth in terms of suggestions to customise or 
amend their products and services.  Both management and employees in one recently 
converted EOB made similar claims:  
“For the people who own shares, since we started doing this we have seen quite a 
difference in terms of people’s creativity and innovation etcetera and also seeming to 
want to go that little bit further” (Director) 
“There doesn’t seem to be as many barriers for ideas for improvements and everybody 
seems to be a lot more proactive and everyone is a lot more enthusiastic and wants the 
company to do well.  They’re not just coming into work and just doing the job and going 
home, everyone is trying to do the best job they can” (Employee)  
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Another key factor which seemed to engender organisational efficacy is the impact of employee 
ownership on recruitment and human capital development within firms.  In particular 
organisational commitment and identification seemed important for productivity 
enhancement.  Greater levels of perceived job security offered by EOBs augmented the 
commitment of workers.  Firms also appeared to view employee ownership as a means of 
differentiation in the labour market.  A number of interviewees stated that being employee-
owned conferred a special status on firms, enabling them to recruit and retain good staff.   
“So we see a growing appetite for training and development, we see people not leaving 
and we see interesting applicants wanting to join the organisation” (Director) 
“I think we have a pretty loyal staff base here. We don’t tend to turnover staff that much 
which is unusual for [the sector]. [The sector] tend[s] to turnover people pretty quickly. 
It’s a sort of kind of a joke in our business that people come here for a few months and 
then stay here for…years” (Director) 
One company maintained that a key advantage for firms was the relationships staff had 
developed with customers.  Relatively low levels of staff turnover compared to their peers 
further augmented the strong customer focus within these businesses:   
“Customers like dealing with employee owned companies because, I think, there’s a 
stability about employee owned companies which customers like and the commitment 
from everybody at the organisation and so we’re looking to exploit that as an employee 
owned company” (Director) 
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4.4 Financialisation and Inclusive Decision Making  
Financialisation, and the need for cost savings and performance measures, have been an 
important element driving the DCT.  Within the DCT one would expect financialisation to 
increase financial constrictions on firms and reduced employee involvement in financial 
decision making.  In this respect, the findings are somewhat inconclusive.  While some 
encountered difficulties in their dealings with banks resulting in more modest levels of growth, 
perhaps linked to servicing the loans for taking ownership of the firm, others faced less 
difficulties12.  Overall, employees appear strongly involved in major strategic financial decisions 
and this inclusive approach to financial affairs often meant decisions occurred more slowly 
within these firms.  
The issue of funding did seem to resonate particularly strongly with some of the firms.  While 
not universal, the majority of firms reported difficulties with their primary lenders which 
impacted upon their businesses.  The inference was that banks did not fully understand the 
nature of employee ownership and that this lack of knowledge penalised them.  Indeed, in one 
instance the change into employee ownership precipitated the bank to withdraw their 
overdraft facility.  This can have significant ramifications for some, but not all, EOBs: 
“We had no overdraft at all, they pulled the plug. They wouldn’t support the change of 
ownership. So, huge barriers” (Director) 
                                                          
12 The researchers were not able to directly ascertain the extent to which servicing loans to fund the transferal of 
ownership affected their ability (or desire) to seek external sources of finance.   
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“We’ve experienced no barriers – we have raised finance, albeit hire purchase finance…the 
banks are all too keen to deal with us…because we’re borrowing more than £50,000 we 
had to put it out for approval for employee owners” (Director) 
While this disruption was rare in our sample, for those who had recently transitioned into 
employee ownership there seemed to be other consequences of funders’ lack of knowledge.  
For some this resulted in a “more patient attitude towards growth” (Director) being 
undertaken by the firms.  This more cautious approach towards business growth engendered 
greater self-sufficiency in terms of financial resources.  The use of retained profits to fund 
the expansion of these businesses was a core strategy deployed to counter limitations of 
credit availability.  Owing to the strong profitability of some firms this was not seen as 
problematic, but for others it was seen as a considerable barrier to growth.   
“For us finance is a big, big challenge. We don’t have investors; we don’t have huge 
amounts of capital. You know we don’t have millions of pounds sitting in the bank 
waiting to absorb some sort of mistake that we might make… we don’t have any 
flexibility or movement to make mistakes so we have to move carefully, we have to 
move slowly, we have to expand our business within the confines of what we can 
finance ourselves or we can get small amounts of lending from the bank” (Director)  
Another crucial knock-on effect of employee ownership on organisational behaviour 
concerned the inclusive decision-making process within firms.  Most of the firms highlighted 
that being employee-owned entailed much slower financial decision making processes.  This 
was mainly because employees had to be consulted prior to any major strategic capital 
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investment decisions being made.  In some instances this was felt to have a detrimental 
effect which stifled organisational responsiveness: “even when people have a bright idea...it 
can be very slow” (Director).  Highlighting the negotiated nature of this process, one Director 
remarked:  
“I liken our business to a glacier, we are very powerful when we do move but we move 
incredibly slowly because we have always got to be checking and making sure that what 
we’re doing is the right thing for our membership. I would say that that can be a good 
thing in most cases, but can also be a bit of a challenge” (Director) 
5. Discussion  
The research examined whether employee-ownership could shield and mitigate against various 
micro-level issues associated with the DCT, such as the overall quality of employment within 
contemporary workplaces, such as workplace participation, employment security, employee 
autonomy, engagement/creativity and the effect of financialisation on decision making.  It 
analysed the issues within the context of a sample of Scottish EOBs to ascertain if these 
organisations have been able to withstand the deleterious effects associated within the DCT.  
Our findings are clear: employee ownership does appear to insulate firms and workers to some 
degree from the dysfunctional elements of contemporary capitalism.  As others have found, 
employee involvement in corporate governance seems to play a crucial role in underpinning a 
firm’s resilience, especially during adverse economic conditions (Lampel et al. 2014; Kurtulus 
and Kruse 2017).   
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It should be noted that these perceptions of greater workplace inclusion and employment 
security are far from uniform across the cohort examined.  The study found that entering into 
employee ownership is a complex and evolving process for both management and employees.  
In more recently converted EOBs, feelings of “role ambiguity” may somewhat impinge on these 
feelings of resilience.  If employees do not know what authority they have and how they will be 
judged they will hesitate to make decisions (Rizzo et al. 1970).  Likewise, managers have to 
adapt to these new organisational forms by adopting a more modest approach to growth due 
to limitations on external finance.  This suggests that employee ownership is a form of “learned 
behaviour” for the actors involved rather than something automatically engendered by 
incorporating this alternative form of ownership structure13.   
In terms of workplace participation, the research found - and corroborated by both managers 
and employees alike – that inclusiveness and strong levels of workplace participation were 
prevalent features within these organisations.  As anticipated within the DCT, employment 
insecurity is predicted to be endemic (Thompson 2013).  By contrast, a central finding here was 
the importance attached to job security as a primary benefit arising from employee ownership.  
This finding corroborates other recent research (Heras-Saizarbitoria 2014; Kurtulus and Kruse 
2017) showing that a fundamental advantage of employee ownership is the ability of these 
firms to offer added levels of employment stability.  This in turn seems to have positive 
spillovers in terms of the overall workplace culture within these firms such as relatively high 
levels of trust, strong employee engagement and high levels of employee commitment coupled 
                                                          
13 The authors are grateful to one of the referees for prompting the authors to consider this differentiated process 
across the firms converting to employee ownership.  
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with high levels of employee creativity.  Therefore, the primary beneficial factors engendered 
by employee ownership are these combinative cognitive factors which translate into feelings of 
inclusion and ownership within the workforce which can act as a bulwark against the 
expectations embedded –especially around job insecurity and alienation- within the DCT.     
Endorsing other recent evidence (Harden et al. 2010), owing to high levels of personal 
delegation, autonomy and empowerment, another key finding was the role employee-
ownership played in fostering the creativity and innovation.  Once again, this finding goes 
against the kind of employee detachment hypothesis predicted by the DCT.  Effective 
performance in employee-owned firms is not simply a function of employees working ‘harder’ 
but employees working ‘smarter’, in line with the notion of ‘upward problem solving’ within 
workplaces identified by others (Marchington 2005).  While traditionally upward problem 
solving is associated with the identification of cost savings (i.e. process innovation), this study 
found that the synergies from a participative workplace can also augment the innovative 
capabilities (i.e. product innovation) of the firm (in line with Blair 1995); especially through 
increased pro-social behaviour and engagement with other employees and customers.  It seems 
a reasonable assumption that employees in the majority of typical firms would not display 
these participatory and pro-social behavioural characteristics harnessing employee creativity.     
Central to the concept of DCT is the malign effects of financialisation for workplace relations 
(Thompson 2013).  From this evidence, the impact of financialisation on EOBs seems to have 
produced mixed effects.  In terms of their ability to obtain capital for growth during the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, for some firms there was little discernible impact.  
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However some managers viewed their ownership structure negatively as banks appeared to 
reduce their ability to obtain external finance and slowed down decision making in the firms.  
On the other hand, the majority of employee respondents felt the benefits of their 
inclusiveness and patient decision making outweighed any drawbacks.   This slower approach 
towards financial decision may result in more long-term strategic planning in these firms.      
Differing perceptions of financialisation allude to wider, quite subtle, cognitive distinctions 
between management and employees within the same firms (see Table 2 below). For managers 
the importance of direct financial participation is viewed as the key motivational driver and the 
basis of a strong perceived work ethos within employees.  For employees, on the other hand, 
financial incentives were less immediately important whereas feelings of responsibility and 
commitment to the organisation increased in importance.  Given the impact of the recession, 
the key motivation for most employees was job security and commitment rather than any 
perceived financial gain resulting from being a shareholder in firms.  In other words, intrinsic 
factors seemed to be a key motivational driver for workers (Pendleton et al. 1998; Levine 1990; 
Wagner et al. 2003), rather than the extrinsic motivators assumed by managers.  This 
differentiated perspective points to the need to better comprehend the variable and 
negotiated cognitive factors underpinning employee ownership.  
    [Insert Table 2 about here]    
6. Conclusions 
This study makes a number of important contributions to the literature on employee ownership 
and disconnected capitalism respectively.  Contrary to the expectations embedded within the 
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DCT there does not appear to be a single or ‘inevitable’ workplace outcome emanating from 
these powerful forces.  In other words, employee owned workplaces are different.  By adopting 
a theoretically-informed inductive case study approach the research yielded important new 
empirical insights on this growing organisational phenomenon.  It reveals a series of complex 
causal processes underpinning their relatively strong performance and inclusive workplace 
practices which supports the perpetuation of a virtuous cycle of high commitment and high 
productivity.  It appears the “safety net” of secure employment is a crucial ingredient 
underpinning the positive cognitive and relational processes embedded within these 
organisations.   
All this suggests a powerful role should be ascribed to the cognitive aspects of ownership within 
organisations.   Employee ownership engenders a relational bond between employees and 
firms, enabling a form of “connected capitalism”.14  Within these atypical employment 
environments - in contrast to the DCT - employees feel strongly connected and committed to 
their employer, with resultant benefits particularly in terms of employee engagement, greater 
levels of employee creativity and, ultimately, enhanced productivity gains.   
Of course, employee ownership is no organisational panacea.  These firms are far from immune 
from the wider systemic forces, including financialisation, within the global economy that may 
reduce job security and other benefits perceived by employees over time.  Adapting to 
employee ownership seems to be temporally mediated as new behaviours and attitudes take 
time to become organisationally and culturally embedded.  Additionally, there are clearly 
                                                          
14 There is a strong undercurrent of “ownership” within the aforementioned film on employee ownership 
exemplified by the following quotation: “I treat my job like it’s my own business” (Michael Miller, New Belgium 
Brewing Company, quoted in ‘We the Owners’, 2013).   
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different sides to the story of employee ownership which have been largely overlooked in 
previous research.  Clearly, turning workers into ‘capitalists’ does not, by itself, completely 
change the “capital-labour relationship” (see Cathcart 2014).   
From a theoretical perspective, these findings suggest that considerable care is needed when 
translating employment trends into overarching theoretical constructs such as the DCT.  The 
manner in which disconnected capitalism takes hold and mediates organisational behaviour is 
far from uniform.  Therefore, further theoretical refinement is needed to examine the 
generalisability, applicability and durability of this concept.  Exploring the variegated nature of 
the DCT across different organisational forms could potentially yield valuable additional 
explanatory insights into the nature of contemporary capitalism.   
Inevitably, there are limitations with this kind of inductive research in terms of its wider 
generalisability.  Given the fluidity of changes inherent within contemporary workplaces, 
further work is clearly needed using different research methods, geographical contexts and 
theoretical perspectives to closely scrutinise whether firms within employee ownership can 
continue to “keep their side of the bargain” given the magnitude of the powerful forces 
(re)shaping the turbulent post-Fordist era.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of Case Study Firms 
 
Company 
Sector Date 
established 
Number of employees in 
2012 (rounded) 
Turnover in 2012 (£m)* 
A Information and 
communication 
1972 15 0.5m 
B Manufacturing 1994 40 11.8m 
C Care Industry 1994 250 4.15m 
D Manufacturing  1809    690* 166m 
E Retail 1977 160 11.5m 
F Manufacturing 1970 150 8m 
G Food Processing 2008 110 29m 
H Professional Services 2009 20 1.5m 
I Manufacturing 1878 30 5m 
J Primary 1967 130 46m 
Source: Interviews/published company sources.  
*including some located overseas 
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Table 2:  Perceived Benefits of Employee Ownership  
Thematic Issues Employees  Managers 
Transitions to Employee 
Ownership 
Fear of the unknown i.e. “role 
ambiguity”; feelings of uncertainty 
and ‘anxiety’ about the financial 
health of the business  
Breaking feelings of “them and 
us” between management and 
workers  
Changes to Workplace 
Culture 
Increased feelings of togetherness - 
“all in it together” - translated into a 
more inclusive work environment  
Getting more input into 
decision-making to enhance 
organisational “performance” 
and make better (although 
slower) decisions 
Factors Contributing to 
Organisational 
Performance 
 
 
Job security – “not about the 
financial rewards….it’s more about 
job security” 
Perceived responsibility  -“it’s 
securing your future”- to work 
‘harder’ due to greater levels of 
commitment to the firm  
Slow financial decision making was 
seen as a positive rather than a 
negative which could ‘guard against 
doing rash things’ 
 
Due to their incentivisation, 
employees work harder ‘to 
enjoy the growth in capital’.  
 
Employees deemed to work 
‘smarter’ and more creatively in 
terms of more upward problem 
solving 
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